Evolution of extortion in structured populations by Szolnoki, Attila & Perc, Matjaž
PHYSICAL REVIEW E 89, 022804 (2014)
Evolution of extortion in structured populations
Attila Szolnoki1 and Matjazˇ Perc2
1Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
2Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Korosˇka cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
(Received 17 November 2013; published 14 February 2014)
Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. But if players are
able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may
sometimes act as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and it can also emerge in interactions between two
populations, yet it is not the evolutionarily stable outcome. Here we revisit these results in the realm of spatial
games. We find that pairwise imitation and birth-death dynamics return known evolutionary outcomes. Myopic
best response strategy updating, on the other hand, reveals counterintuitive solutions. Defectors and extortioners
coarsen spontaneously, which allows cooperators to prevail even at prohibitively high temptations to defect.
Here extortion strategies play the role of a Trojan horse. They may emerge among defectors by chance, and
once they do, cooperators become viable as well. These results are independent of the interaction topology, and
they highlight the importance of coarsening, checkerboard ordering, and best response updating in evolutionary
games.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is an evolutionary riddle, as it defies the
basic principles of natural selection. If during the course
of evolution only the fittest survive, why should one sac-
rifice individual fitness for the benefit of unrelated others?
Widespread cooperation in nature is indeed one of the most
important challenge to Darwin’s theory of evolution and
natural selection. Understanding the evolution of cooperation
means understanding also the main evolutionary transitions
that led from single-cell organisms to complex animal and
human societies [1], and it is therefore not surprising that the
subject consistently attracts attention across large contingents
of social and natural sciences.
Evolutionary game theory [2–5] is frequently employed as
the theoretical framework within which we try to understand
and explain the evolution of cooperation. Prominent mecha-
nisms that promote cooperative behavior are kin selection [6],
network reciprocity [7], direct and indirect reciprocity [8,9],
and group [10] and multilevel selection [11,12], all of which
were comprehensively reviewed as the five rules for the
evolution of cooperation in [13]. There are also a number
of related reviews devoted to evolutionary games that survey
succinctly recent advances made along this vibrant avenue of
research [14–19].
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is probably the most
often used workhorse for studying the evolution of cooperation
among selfish individuals [20–32]. The famous tournaments
organized by Axelrod [33] have revealed that tit for tat is the
most successful strategy. Similar to retaliation or reciprocity,
the virtue of the tit-for-tat strategy is to follow an opponent’s
previous action, although initially to always cooperate. Only
a few concepts have thus far been able to challenge the
success of this simple but effective strategy [21]. Press and
Dyson have recently introduced so-called zero-determinant
strategies [34]. These strategies impose a linear relation
between one’s own payoff and the payoff of the other player.
Extortion strategies are a subset of zero-determinant strategies,
which furthermore ensure that an increase in one’s own payoff
exceeds the increase in the other player’s payoff by a fixed
percentage. Extortion strategies are therefore able to dominate
any evolutionary opponent, including tit for tat and, in fact,
all other strategies [35]. But in the realm of evolutionary
games, where players are able to imitate strategies that are
performing better, extortion quickly becomes widespread and,
in fact, evolutionarily unstable [36]. If everybody extorts, it
is better to cooperate. The outlook for extortioners, however,
is not quite so bleak, especially if the two players engaged in
the game belong to distinct populations or if the population
size is very small [37]. It is also possible to devise generous
zero-determinant strategies, which support each other and are
therefore evolutionarily stable [38].
II. METHODS AND RESULTS
Here we continue to explore the evolutionary viability of
extortion, but instead of well-mixed populations, we focus
on games in structured populations [14]. By doing so, we
take into account the fact that the interactions among players
are frequently not random or best described by a well-mixed
model, but rather, they are limited to a set of other players in
the population and as such are best described by a network.
We consider a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions as the simplest of networks to fulfill this condition,
as well as a scale-free network with the same average degree,
which is likely a more apt model for realistic social and
technological networks [39]. As we will show, however, the
main results remain unaffected by the topological differences
of the interaction networks.
In terms of game parametrization, we closely follow the
work of Hilbe et al. [37], where extortion was studied
in the realm of the donation game. The latter is a special case of
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, which, however, retains
all the original properties of the social dilemma. The competing
strategies are cooperation C, defection D, and extortion Eχ .
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The payoff matrix is
Eχ C D
Eχ 0 (b
2−c2)χ
bχ+c 0
C b
2−c2
bχ+c b − c −c
D 0 b 0
, (1)
where b is the benefit to the other player provided by each
cooperator at cost c and χ determines the surplus of the
extortioner in relation to the surplus of the other player.
Moreover, we use b − c = 1, thus having b > 1 and χ > 1 as
the two main parameters. The former determines the strength
of the social dilemma, while the latter determines just how
strongly strategy Eχ exploits cooperators. It is worth noting
that we are focusing on the simplest three-strategy model
and thus do not consider strategies such as tit-for-tat [40]
or win-stay-lose-learn [41] or generous zero-determinant
strategies [38]. Partly, this is because the evolutionary success
of some of these strategies has already been studied thoroughly
in structured populations, but it is also because we wish to keep
the analysis as conclusive and as clear as possible with regards
to the evolutionary prospects of extortion.
Unless stated otherwise, for example, to illustrate specific
invasion processes as in Fig. 3, we use random initial con-
ditions such that all three strategies are uniformly distributed
across the network. We carry out Monte Carlo simulations
comprising the following elementary steps. First, a randomly
selected player x with strategy sx acquires its payoff px by
playing the game with its k neighbors, as specified by the
underlying interaction network. Next, player x changes its
strategy sx to s ′x with the probability
q(s ′x → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(px − p′x)/K]
, (2)
where p′x is the payoff of the same player if adopting strategy s ′x
within the same neighborhood and K is the uncertainty related
to the strategy adoption process [14]. Strategy s ′x should, of
course, be different from sx , and it is drawn randomly from
the remaining two strategies. Such strategy updating is known
as the myopic best response rule [42]. We also consider the
more traditional strategy imitation, where player x imitates
the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor y, except that
p′x in Eq. (2) is replaced by py [22], as well as death-birth
updating as described, for example, in [43]. Regardless of
the applied strategy updating rule, we let the system evolve
towards the stationary state where the average frequency of
strategies becomes time independent.
The results obtained via strategy imitation and birth-death
updating are quickly explained, and they are, in fact, qualita-
tively in agreement with the results obtained on well-mixed
populations in that extortion strategies face a rather gloomy
evolutionary outlook [36,37]. In particular, if b is low enough
for cooperators to survive in the presence of defectors (which
would be due to network reciprocity [7]), then Eχ always
die out regardless of χ . On the other hand, if b is too
high for cooperators to survive, the remaining defectors and
extortioners become neutral. But since D are, in general, more
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Myopic best response strategy updating
preserves cooperation across the whole interval of the temptation to
defect b if extortioners are part of the game (lines). If only cooperators
and defectors compete, the latter rise to complete dominance already
at b = 1.09 (symbols). Extortion thus catalyzes cooperation in
structured populations. Here we have used χ = 1.5 to define the
extortion strategy Eχ . Figure 2 shows results for the whole b-χ plane
and for two different interaction networks.
successful in invading cooperators than Eχ , the majority of
players at the time of cooperation extinction will have strategy
D. The absorbing D phase is therefore a much more likely final
evolutionary outcome of logarithmically slow coarsening [44]
than the absorbing Eχ phase. Overall, extortion is unable to
capitalize on structured interactions if the strategy updating is
governed by imitation or a birth-death rule.
Myopic strategy updating, on the other hand, reveals very
different behavior as it allows players to adopt strategies that
are not necessarily present in their interaction neighborhood.
To begin with, it is worth emphasizing that such strategy
updating is not equivalent to mutation because each individual
update is still driven by the payoffs [see Eq. (2)]. The
difference compared to mutation-driven evolution can be
illustrated nicely with the traditional two-strategy version
of the prisoner’s dilemma game, where cooperators always
die out above a critical temptation to defect. As depicted in
Fig. 1 (symbols), the frequency of cooperators goes to zero
at b = 1.09. We also note that in this paper, to avoid the
potentially disturbing impact of noise, we have used K = 0.05
in Eq. (2), which practically prevents a strategy change if the
new strategy does not yield a higher payoff.
Unexpectedly, if all three strategies compete, extortion
provides an evolutionary escape hatch for cooperators to
survive even at the most prohibitive conditions (b = 2), as
illustrated in Fig. 1 (lines). This result is counterintuitive
because the introduction of extortioners increases the number
of those who exploit cooperators. Although extortion acts
more subtly than defection, it is still difficult to imagine
how it can promote cooperation. Moreover, extortion itself
becomes evolutionarily stable and, at sufficiently large b,
even outperforms cooperation. Results presented in Fig. 2
add further support to these claims, evidencing that extortion
indeed always supports some level of cooperation, as long as
χ is within reasonable bounds and b < 2. Moreover, this result
is independent of the topology of the interaction network.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Color-coded stationary frequency of
cooperators on the whole b-χ parameter plane as obtained on (left) the
scale-free network and (right) the square lattice by means of myopic
best response strategy updating. Cooperators are able to survive across
the whole interval of the temptation to defect b as long as χ is not too
large. This outcome is independent of the interaction topology since
results obtained on the square lattice and on the scale-free network
are, to a large extent, the same.
To explain these results, we monitor the evolution of the
distribution of strategies from three different homogeneous
states. The top row of Fig. 3 starts from a full C phase.
Expectedly, defection emerges fast and so does extortion
since both strategies offer higher payoffs than cooperation
in the neighborhood of other cooperators. The middle row
of Fig. 3 depicts the evolution from a full Eχ phase. Here
defectors emerge by chance as they are neutral to extortioners,
but cooperators emerge because their payoff is higher in
the sea of extortioners. Interestingly, if strategy D were not
an alternative, a checkerboard configuration would emerge
spontaneously, where C and Eχ are able to support each
other due to their snowdrift-like relation (see the inset of
Fig. 4). But the availability of strategy D destroys this ordering,
instead giving rise to a mixed C + D + Eχ phase. The most
interesting phenomenon, however, is the erosion of the full D
phase depicted in the bottom row of Fig. 3. Here, initially,
only extortioners emerge by chance since cooperators are
obviously not competitive. Yet the emergence of Eχ allows
cooperators to appear as well. More precisely, the coarsening
of D and Eχ players will result in small homogeneous
Eχ clusters, which creates the chance for cooperators to
appear. In this way, extortion thus plays the role of a Trojan
Horse and helps cooperators conquer defector-dominant areas.
Nevertheless, the spreading of cooperation, which utilizes the
neutral drift of Eχ , will be controlled by defectors, who can
strike back since their presence in place of an extortioner
may yield a higher payoff in a predominantly cooperative
neighborhood. Temporarily, this is certainly the case, but soon
thereafter, other players within the neighborhood will start
changing their strategies too, eventually arriving at the pure
D (at least locally) zero-productivity state. From this point
onwards, extortioners will start reappearing through neutral
drift and will essentially restart the whole cycle of dominance
again. The stationary mixed C + D + Eχ phase, which is
specific for the applied value of b and χ , ultimately sets in
as a consequence of the described elementary evolutionary
invasions.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Spatial distributions of cooperators [blue
(dark gray)], defectors [red (medium gray)], and extortioners (light
gray), as obtained from three different initial conditions on the
square lattice by means of myopic best response strategy updating.
(a)–(c) Evolution starts from a full C phase. Extortioners and
defectors can emerge because they are both superior in the sea of
cooperators. But defectors are more probable due to their relatively
higher payoffs. (d)–(f) Evolution starts from a full Eχ phase.
Defectors emerge by chance since they are neutral to extortioners.
Cooperators also emerge because they outperform extortioners if the
latter are in the majority. (g)–(i) Evolution starts from a full D phase.
Here Eχ emerge by chance since they are neutral to defectors. As
soon as extortioners segregate and form small compact domains,
cooperators become viable too. The pure D phase thus erodes to give
rise to a stable mixed C + D + Eχ phase that sets in regardless of
the initial conditions. Parameter values in all three cases are b = 1.5,
χ = 1.5, K = 0.05, and L = 40. Initial homogeneous states are not
shown.
Although extortion can be as counterproductive as defec-
tion, it is still less destructive. For a cooperator it never pays to
stick with the strategy if surrounded by defectors, but it may
be the best option among extortioners. Evidently, cooperators
are happiest among other cooperators, but in the presence of
extortioners they can still attain a positive payoff, and this is
much better than nothing or a negative value in the presence
of defectors. Accordingly, in a homogeneous population
of extortioners it is better to deviate by cooperating [37].
Although in structured populations this change always happens
locally, it can also be observed globally in a two-strategy
game entailing only C and Eχ strategies. As illustrated in
the inset of Fig. 4, the snowdrift relation gives rise to a
checkerboard ordering, where extortioners do not have to
interact with players of their own kind. We note that similar
ordering was already observed in traditional C − D spatial
games under myopic updating [45], yet it cannot be observed
under imitation dynamics unless the imitation does not apply to
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FIG. 4. (Color online) In the absence of defectors, cooperators
and extortioners are effectively engaged in a snowdrift game. This
relation between strategiesC andEχ results in checkerboard ordering,
where players do not have to interact with others of the same
kind (see inset). The stationary fraction of cooperators fC therefore
remains high regardless of χ and regardless of the topology of the
interaction network (main panel). Importantly, the separation emerges
spontaneously due to the snowdrift relation and myopic best response
strategy updating. Parameter values are b = 1.5 (main panel and
inset) and χ = 2 (inset).
strategy but rather to a different determinant of behavior, such
as emotions [46]. Importantly, the role-separating coexistence
of C and Eχ players is not restricted to low χ values, and it is
also independent of the interaction topology, as evidenced in
the main panel of Fig. 4.
III. SUMMARY
To sum up, extortion is evolutionarily stable in structured
populations if the strategy updating is governed by a myopic
best response rule. Counterintuitively, the stability of extor-
tioners helps cooperators survive even under the most testing
conditions, whereby the neutral drift of Eχ players serves
as the entry point, akin to a Trojan horse, for cooperation
to grab a hold among defectors. The mutually rewarding
checkerboard-like coexistence of cooperators and extortioners
can always be temporarily disturbed by defectors since they
may earn more in the same neighborhood. But this does
not last long since the neighborhood is soon to follow, thus
yielding a configuration with zero productivity. The neutral
drift, i.e., coarsening in the spatial system, then reintroduces
extortioners, and the whole cycle starts anew. The exploration
of extortion by means of myopic updating thus offers an
unlikely evolutionary niche for the evolution of cooperation, so
it highlights the potential importance of best response updating
that is arguably an integral part of human behavior [47].
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